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I. INTRODUCTION 
The pharmaceutical industry is a competitive business. Companies spend 
billions of dollars researching and developing new drugs. 1 Many drugs never 
make it to market. For the limited drugs that make it through the 
experimental, regulatory, and clinical rigors of drug development, companies 
recoup their lost expenditures for the drugs that previously failed.  
Pharmaceutical companies face increasing pressure to bring new 
treatments to market in order to survive. The economic reality of survival and 
profits may distort a company’s decision-making process regarding full 
disclosure on a particular new drug. An example of this type of conflict was 
seen in the silicone breast implant fiasco in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Dow 
Corning, the manufacturer of the implants, withheld important data from 
long-term animal models that demonstrated adverse effects from the breast 
implants.2 Further, Dow failed to conduct long-term studies on breast 
implants, even when armed with data indicating that such studies were 
necessary to ensure the continued health of the patients.3 Presumably, Dow 
stood to lose large sums of money if it conducted the long-term studies 
because it might establish the implants were harmful. It took litigation to 
expose Dow’s failure to conduct the proper studies of the long-term effects of 
its implants.  
                                                   
† Associate Professor of Law, California Western School of Law, 225 Cedar St., San Diego, 
CA 92101, (619) 515-1553, jsax@cwsl.edu; J.D. University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D. 
University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine. The author thanks Michal Belknap, Larry 
Benner, Glenn Smith, and participants in the symposium for valuable comments and 
criticisms. 
1 Frank Vinluan, Pharma Spending on R&D Nosedived in 2009, Study Finds, Triangle 
Bus. J. (May 31, 2010), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/stories/2010/05/31/story12.html (“R&D spending 
among U.S. pharma companies last year declined by thirteen percent, to $17.2 billion from 
$19.8 billion in 2008.”). 
2 Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1994). 
3 Id. 
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Pharmaceutical companies are experts in marketing their new drugs. To 
do this in the medical and scientific literature, companies will publish posit ive 
results of their clinical trials.4 They tend not, however, to disclose negative 
results of clinical trials in scientific publications, or they down-play the 
negative results. Further, pharmaceutical companies may suppress negative 
results, change design studies, or halt studies early if they think the results 
may not be positive.5 No regulation requires that industry publish negative 
results, and the scientific community, the public, and policymakers may never 
be aware of such negative results.6  
Pharmaceutical companies expend enormous resources promoting new 
drugs. In addition to direct-to-consumer advertisements, they publish results 
in non-peer reviewed scientific/medical journals, host symposiums, and write 
multiple articles citing their own work. They use these tactics to flood the 
medical and scientific literature with positive information about their drug. 
This might not be so harmful if it were not often intertwined with strategies of 
suppressing negative results in clinical trials. That is, some of the publications 
are misleading because they only tell half the story—but the other half, i.e., the 
negative consequences from the drug, is not reported. This selective reporting 
causes harm because doctors may be misled into using an inferior or harmful 
treatment. 
Part II of this article analyzes the publication tactics employed by some 
members of the pharmaceutical industry (hereinafter “industry”) and explains 
how some of the publications promote misleading information. In recent 
years, an entire sector has arisen to assist in the publication and promotion of 
pharmaceutical drugs. This section also introduces the Lanham Act, which 
prohibits false advertising. Claims against some industry tactics may be 
brought under the Lanham Act.  
It is unclear, however, whether the Lanham Act can adequately address 
the issues with biased or misleading industry publications. For this reason, 
Part III proposes policy recommendations to require accurate dissemination 
                                                   
4 See, e.g., Mark Friedberg et al., Evaluation of Conflict of Interest in Economic Analyses 
of New Drugs Used in Oncology, 282 JAMA 1453, 1453 (1999) (“Similarly, a study of clinical 
trial publications determined that there was a significant association between positive results 
in general internal medicine clinical trials and funding from a pharmaceutical manufacturer.”) 
Of note, the Friedberg study was funded by an unrestricted grant from Amgen, Inc., which had 
a contractual right to review and comment on the manuscript and abstract prior to 
publication. See also Sameer S. Chopra, Industry Funding of Clinical Trials: Benefit or Bias?, 
290 JAMA 113, 113 (2003) (“Research supported by pharmaceutical companies may also be 
subject to methodological bias. Industry funded clinical trials and cost-effectiveness analyses, 
for instance, yield positive results far more often than studies that are funded or conducted by 
other entities.”). 
5 See Chopra, supra note 4, at 113 (“Numerous industry-sponsored trials, for example, are 
prematurely terminated for financial rather than for scientific or ethical reasons.”).  
6 In 2007, Congress expanded the use of a trial registry data bank that requires the 
registration of clinical trials for life-threatening conditions. Food and Drug Administration 
Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 801, 121 Stat. 823, 904-22 (2007) [hereinafter 
FDAAA] (amending 42 U.S.C. § 282). This is a limited regulation that does not encompass all 
the past and ongoing studies conducted by the pharmaceutical companies.  See also 
Clinicaltrails.gov Fact Sheet, Nat’l Insts. of Health, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/pubs/factsheets/clintrial.html  (last updated Sept. 15, 2009) (The 
legislation requires the Department of Health and Human Services, through the NIH, to 
establish a registry of clinical trials for both federally and privately funded trials “of 
experimental treatments for serious or life-threatening diseases or conditions.”).  
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of the results of clinical trials in order to protect scientific integrity and the 
public welfare. As previously called for by me and others, a national registry of 
all clinical trials would provide, in part, the needed transparency. The reader 
of any publication reporting the results of a clinical study could cross-check 
the accuracy of the data with a national registry. Another recommendation is 
to enact a regulation called the Truth in Marketing (TIM) Act. The TIM Act’s 
policy objectives would expand the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) 
current regulatory authority to penalize pharmaceutical companies for false or 
misleading direct-to-consumer advertising by including regulation of 
indirect-to-consumer marketing, such as publications in scientific journals. In 
addition, the TIM Act would provide for a private cause of action so that 
individuals and groups can bring claims against pharmaceutical companies 
for false or misleading publications found in scientific journals. The private 
cause of action would be limited to claims against a party that has a profit-
seeking motive, thus traditional academic hypotheses would not be impacted 
by this regulation. In essence, the TIM Act is a combination and extrapolation 
of the Lanham Act and other FDA programs, but the focus is on indirect-to-
consumer marketing by the pharmaceutical industry. 
An obvious defense on the part of industry to anything resembling the 
TIM Act is that their speech is fully protected by the First Amendment. Part 
IV of this article addresses whether industry publications are fully protected 
scientific speech or less fully protected commercial speech, and it concludes 
that the industry publications fall within the latter category. This section also 
analyzes whether the publications are misleading, which ends the inquiry 
there, or whether it is necessary to enact regulations that appropriately 
protect the public interest in sound science. This part concludes that no 
current federal regulation addresses these misleading or biasing industry 
tactics in a sufficient manner, and again stresses the need for a regulation 
such as the TIM Act.  
II. MISLEADING INDUSTRY PUBLICATIONS 
The pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies publish components of 
their research in a variety of medical and scientific journals in order to 
promote their companies’ product(s). Previous studies demonstrate that 
industry publications have a bias in that they tend to report positive results of 
clinical trials.7 This is not surprising because industry has a profit-seeking 
motive and companies are likely to closely monitor the progress and process of 
a research study in such a way that adverse results may be suppressed leading 
to the publication of biased results.8  
This bias does not exist—or at least not to the same extreme—in 
publications by academic laboratories that receive public funding. This is 
most likely due, in part, to the culture of academic science and the process of 
                                                   
7 Friedberg et al., supra note 4, at 1455 (“Studies funded by pharmaceutical companies 
were nearly 8 times less likely to reach unfavorable qualitative conclusions than nonprofit -
funded studies and 1.4 times more likely to reach favorable qualitative conclusions.”).  
8 Wendy Wagner & David Michaels, Equal Treatment for Regulatory Science: Extending 
the Controls Governing the Quality of Public Research to Private Research , 30 Am. J.L. & Med. 
119, 120 (2004). 
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peer review. Academic scientists publish results of their studies to 
communicate with other scientists in an attempt to collaboratively advance 
science. While most academic scientists publish positive results of 
experiments, a lot can be learned from results that are negative or not 
statistically significant. It is similar to the old adage—don’t reinvent the 
wheel. Once a study has failed, there is value in communicating the results so 
that another laboratory does not waste time or resources only to find a dead 
end. It must be noted that even in the academic realm, there is a dearth of 
publications of negative results.  
A. Publishing Tactics 
This article focuses on industry’s ability to manipulate scientists, 
physicians and ultimately the public through the publication of misleading 
studies. Some members of industry employ tactics to promote their studies, 
such as paying companies to find placements, hosting their own symposiums, 
publishing the same results in multiple journals, using ghost-authors and 
publishing results by paying to be placed in corporate-sponsored 
publications.9 Furthermore, there is a significant association between the 
reporting of positive results in a clinical trial of a new drug or treatment and 
funding from a pharmaceutical manufacturer.10 For example, Mark Friedberg 
and colleagues conducted a study to determine whether “pharmaceutical 
company-funded economic studies are more likely than nonprofit-funded 
studies to report favorable qualitative assessments and less likely to report 
unfavorable qualitative assessments.”11 This study concluded that “[s]tudies 
funded by pharmaceutical companies were nearly 8 times less likely to reach 
unfavorable qualitative conclusions than nonprofit-funded studies and 1.4 
times more likely to reach favorable qualitative conclusions.” 12 The study also 
                                                   
9 Id. at 125 (“Some sponsors, for example, have been caught publishing the same study in 
different journals under different author names with no cross-references, making it appear 
that the research support in favor of their product or activity is based on severa l independent 
studies, rather than simply a re-reporting of the same findings”); see Sergio Sismondo, Ghost 
Management: How Much of the Medical Literature is Shaped Behind the Scenes by the 
Pharmaceutical Industry?, 4 PLoS Med. 1429, 1429 (2007) (“In extreme cases, drug 
companies pay for trials by contract research organizations (CROs), analyze the data in-house, 
have professionals write manuscripts, ask academics to serve as authors of those manuscripts, 
and pay communication companies to shepherd them through publication in the best journals. 
The resulting articles affect conclusions found in the medical literature, and are use d in 
promoting drugs to doctors”); see also Richard Smith, Conflicts of Interest: How Money Clouds 
Objectivity, 99 J. Royal Soc’y Med. 292, 293 (2006) (“In fact, the only factor associated with 
the review’s conclusion was whether the author was affiliated with the tobacco industry. 
Three-quarters of the articles concluding that passive smoking was not harmful were written 
by tobacco industry affiliates” (citation omitted)). 
10 See Friedberg et al., supra note 4, at 1453; Smith, supra note 9, at 293 (“The JAMA 
review found 11 studies that compared the outcome of studies sponsored by industry and those 
not so sponsored. In every study those that were sponsored were more likely to have a finding 
favourable to industry” (internal citation omitted)); see also Sismondo, supra note 9, at 1429. 
11 See Friedberg et al., supra note 4, at 1453. 
12 See id. at 1455. A number of reasons may account for this. For example, the 
pharmaceutical company may be more likely to conduct clinical trials based on highly positive 
initial studies. Another reason, however, could be that pharmaceutical companies may want to 
control what is published and simply decide not to publish negative results. These, and other 
reasons, are suggested in the study conducted by Friedberg and colleagues.  
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found that the qualitative statements were actually overstatements of 
quantitative results.13 
An entire industry is dedicated to helping pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology companies place their publications in journals, which can have 
a considerable influence on medical research. 14 For example, one company 
named Current Medical Directions (CMD) assists pharmaceutical companies 
with the publication of articles.15 Although the full range of services offered by 
companies such as CMD is unclear, it appears that CMD may help 
pharmaceutical companies place articles in higher-ranked journals, find 
academics to ghost-author articles, and assist in garnering citations to the 
particular article.16 All of these tactics increase exposure to the results of the 
particular study. 
The use of these types of commercial tactics to publish articles is 
antithetical to the academic and scientific process of publication, which uses a 
peer review system to advance paradigms or argue for paradigm shifts. 
Scientific integrity is protected, in part, by the review of submitted research 
articles by scientific peers. The scientists review articles to determine whether 
the conclusions are valid based on the experiments, whether the proposed 
articles advance scientific understanding, and whether additional experiments 
are needed to prove the authors’ conclusions. Instead of subjecting themselves 
to peer review, some members of industry will skirt around this system by 
creating their own publications, such as symposium issues, which allows them 
to promote their products without having the academic and scientific 
community review the research prior to publication. Even if a company 
submits its findings to a peer reviewed journal, studies show that privately-
funded clinical trials report a bias in favor of their results, such that even the 
peer reviewers may not know if other data exists to temper the statements 
regarding the positive results. In these ways, industry can flood the scientific 
press with articles about their products. 
A problem arises when the industry publications mislead the readers as to 
the conclusions in the paper.17 To illustrate this problem, the following 
hypothetical will be referred to throughout this article:  
                                                   
13 See id.  
14 Sismondo, supra note 9, at 1429; see also MaryAnn Foote & Philip David Noguchi, 
Posting of Clinical Trials and Clinical Trial Results: Information for Medical Writers, 20 Am. 
Med. Writers Ass’n 47, 47 (2005) (informing medical writers who work for drug sponsors of 
the new rules regarding the reporting of clinical trials).  
15 Sismondo, supra note 9, at 1430; see also Our Work, Current Medical Directions, 
http://www.cmdny.com/work.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
16 Sismondo, supra note 9, at 1430 (“[T]he CMD articles were published in more 
prominent journals, had nearly twice as many authors per article, and garnered  nearly three 
times as many citations.”). 
17 Cf. Wagner & Michaels, supra note 8, at 122 (“At the same time that privately 
sponsored research provides a critical input to regulation, there is growing evidence that it can 
be compromised in ways that might underreport or even suppress evidence of harm. Sponsors 
face strong incentives to design and report research in ways most favorable to their interests 
and to suppress adverse results provided they can do so without detection.”).  
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Working Hypothetical: A company has an experimental medicine 
to treat high cholesterol. In a clinical trial, the company learns 
that its drug shows better results than the current standard 
therapy after six months of treatment. The company, however, 
also learns from this clinical study that after twelve months of 
treatment, there is no difference between the company’s new 
drug and treatment with standard therapy.18 Since the twelve-
month results are not helpful to the company to promote the 
product, the company may decide to suppress the twelve-month 
time point and only publish the results of the first six months of 
the study.19 Here, the company publishes the article in a non-peer 
reviewed journal. The company then writes several other articles 
citing its original article. Further, the company publishes a review 
article of drugs on the market for treatment of high cholesterol 
and highlights its own drug. The company then sends the review 
article to policymakers in Washington, D.C. to be used to support 
policies concerning the public health. In addition, the company 
promotes its product by sending reprints of its article to 
clinicians—in an effort to tell them that the company’s new 
product is better than the standard treatment that these 
clinicians are currently prescribing to their patients.  
All of these activities promote misleading or biased information because the 
company knows that there is no difference after one year between their new 
drug and the standard therapy. But by failing to include this information, the 
public, politicians, and clinicians may have no idea. Put differently, the 
publication may be accurate or truthful with respect to the data gathered at 
the six-month time-point, but the publication gives a false impression, via 
omission, that no other data was collected or that no other data exists to 
provide support for a contrary conclusion.20 Plus, the public, politicians, 
scientists, and clinicians have almost no way to confirm or deny the data.  
The hypothetical described above is reminiscent of the breast implant 
fiasco in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Although not a perfect analogy, the Dow 
case highlights the problem when a private company suppresses information 
                                                   
18 The FDA may approve this drug to treat high cholesterol if the results demonstrate that 
the new drug is safe and effective. This is so, even if, for example, the new drug does not offer 
benefits beyond the standard treatment. 
19 Cf. Wagner & Michaels, supra note 8, at 126 (“Finally and perhaps most serious is the 
ability of sponsors to suppress research when the results are adverse to their interests. Unlike 
fraud, suppressing adverse results can sometimes be done with discretionary judgments that 
are not illegal. For example, sponsors can abort research before it is completed, and base this 
decision on limited resources or some purported design flaw in the study. For research that is 
completed, sponsors can still justify withholding the results based on discretionar y judgments 
that the research design or reporting was incomplete or flawed in some way or that follow -up 
research is needed to confirm or validate the findings.”  (citations omitted)).  
20 See Catherine DeAngelis, The Influence of Money on Medical Science, 296 JAMA 996, 
996 (2006) (“There have been a number of high-profile examples of such research 
irregularities involving for-profit companies, such as . . . reporting only 6 months of data in a 
trial designed to have 12 months of data as the primary outcome . . . .”); Chopra, supra note 4, 
at 114 (“Bias may also occur in the reporting of industry-funded clinical trials. Withholding the 
publication of unfavorable results, for example, is not uncommon although the practice is 
considered scientific misconduct.”). 
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or fails to follow-up on preliminary data. At issue in Hopkins v. Dow Corning 
Corp. was whether Dow was liable for a variety of health problems associated 
with its silicone gel breast implants.21 Dow denied liability, but the evidence 
demonstrated that Dow had knowledge of the harmful effects of the breast 
implants and that it suppressed these findings.22 Dow previously conducted 
animal model studies and learned that after six months the implants were 
fine, but that after two years the animals experienced an immune reaction 
around the implants.23 Dow did not publish these results for years, and when 
they did finally release the results they omitted the negative findings, which 
had the consequence of misleading the public to believe that the implants 
were safe.24 On top of this, the animal models and other studies should have 
made it clear to Dow that it needed to conduct long-term studies, but Dow did 
not.25 Presumably, Dow did not want to learn the results of long-term clinical 
studies because they might show that the breast implants were harmful. Both 
the failure to report the animal studies, and the failure to conduct additional 
studies misled the public into believing that Dow’s breast implants were safe, 
though they were not. 
The working hypothetical above addresses the publication of misleading 
information. Previous work analyzes the failure of the pharmaceutical 
industry to publish negative results of clinical trials.26 This previous work 
described that pharmaceutical companies failed to report or failed to study 
anecdotal reports of the treatment of children with antidepressant drugs 
leading to suicidal behaviors in teenagers. Congress held hearings to address 
industry’s failure to conduct appropriate clinical studies in teenage 
populations.27 The failure by some members of industry to publish negative 
results from clinical trials or to follow-up on anecdotal information led, in 
part, to hiding the negative effects of anti-depressants in children.28 In short, 
the omission or hiding of negative data misled the medical world, which 
impacted the public. If this story seems similar to the breast implant case, that 
is because it is. 
A variety of problems stem from the failure to report negative results, or 
only to report positive results, even when the company is aware of negative 
results.29 The first problem is the potentially widespread dissemination of 
these results. This may attract the popular press, which may pick up on an 
industry publication with misleading results and report it to a wide audience. 
Using the working hypothetical posed above, a New York Times reporter may 
write a story reporting that studies with a new cholesterol drug demonstrate 
better results than the standard treatment. A media storm may influence 
patients to request the new drug. Physicians may end up prescribing this new 
                                                   
21 Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1118 (9th Cir. 1994). 
22 Id. at 1119. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 1127. 
26 Joanna K. Sax, Reforming FDA Policy for Pediatric Testing: Challenges and Changes in 
the Wake of Studies Using Antidepressant Drugs , 4 Ind. Health L. Rev. 61, 71-75 (2007). 
27 Id. at 75. 
28 Id. at 75. 
29 Cf. DeAngelis, supra note 20, at 996 (“In some instances, the marketing goal of a 
company dominates the scientific aspect of the company-funded research.”). 
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drug. And all of this occurred because the company published the partial 
results of a clinical trial in a non-peer reviewed journal. 
Second, reporting studies with misleading information, despite evidence 
to the contrary, may lead scientists on a dead-end chase.30 Using our working 
hypothetical, we could assume that the company’s new drug uses a different 
biochemical pathway than the standard treatment. A scientist may see the 
multiple reports and review article promoted by the company including the 
data that the new drug provides more effective treatment than standard 
therapy. It turns out that the new drug uses a different biochemical pathway 
than the standard treatment. The scientist may begin conducting experiments 
to analyze the drug’s biochemical properties in this new pathway. The 
problem is, however, that the new drug is not better than standard treatment 
after one year, and through the misleading publication, the company is, in 
effect, stonewalling scientific progress. Time, energy, and money may be 
wasted. 
The third problem is the potential for the misleading publications to 
influence policy decisions. If the company promotes its misleading study by 
communicating it to policymakers, then the policymakers might rely on 
flawed, biased, or even untrue information. That is, policymakers would be 
using inappropriate information to create policy.31 Finally, misleading 
industry publications stifle scientific progress and chip away at the public’s 
trust in scientists.32 In sum, misleading industry publications threaten 
scientific integrity. 
The tobacco industry’s use of propaganda in the 1960s and 1970s is an 
example of the parade of evils described above. During those two decades, the 
tobacco industry refuted evidence of harmful effects of second-hand smoke.33 
The tobacco industry flooded the scientific literature with studies that 
concluded that passive smoking was not harmful.34 The tobacco industry did 
this by publishing articles in non-peer reviewed journals, publishing their own 
articles, and writing letters to the editor in medical journals.35 The majority of 
articles that concluded that passive smoking was not harmful were written by 
                                                   
30 Cf. Heidi Ledford, Diabetes Drugs Offered Fresh Start, 466 Nature 420, 420 (2010) 
(“Since Avandia (rosiglitazone) hit the market, he [Steven Nissen] said, developers have 
wasted their time on at least 50 other drugs that act by a similar mechanism. All of them 
failed, Nissen said, some because they posed similar risks to the heart.”). 
31 Wagner & Michaels, supra note 8, at 121. 
32 See also Catherine D. DeAngelis, Phil B. Fontanarosa, & Annette Flanagin, Reporting 
Financial Conflicts of Interest and Relationships Between Investigators and Research 
Sponsors, 286 JAMA 89, 90 (2001) (“Moreover, this level of involvement and control of the 
research could be viewed as the sponsor having the potential to influence the study results and 
might create doubts about the validity of the research. These concerns are not without 
foundation; previous reports have documented several major problems in some industry-
sponsored studies, including issues related to trial design, data availability, and control over 
publication.” (internal citations omitted)). 
33 See Lisa A. Bero, Tobacco Industry Manipulation of Research , 120 Pub. Health Rep. 
200, 200-01 (describing strategies utilized by the tobacco industry to manipulate the research 
on the harmful effects of smoking). 
34 See id. at 202-03 (“The tobacco industry uses several vehicles to publish the findings of 
its sponsored research, including symposium proceedings, books, journal articles, and letters 
to the editor in medical journals”); Smith, supra note 9, at 293. 
35 Bero, supra note 33, at 202-03. 
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the tobacco industry and its affiliates.36 To give credibility to its own research, 
the tobacco industry then cited its own publications in non-peer reviewed 
publications and in policy arenas.37 The tobacco industry also wrote review 
articles, citing their own work.38 Policymakers often rely on review articles 
because they are supposed to provide a summary of the most up-to-date 
data.39 Another tactic utilized included suppressing or criticizing research that 
did not support the tobacco industry’s position.40 The tobacco industry used 
numerous tactics to mislead policymakers and the public for decades. It took 
decades of research and education to overcome the strength of the tobacco 
industry’s lobbying efforts to finally inform the public and policymakers o f the 
harmful effects of second-hand smoke. 
B. Regulating Misleading Publications 
Industry publications that fail to report negative results may or may not 
be subject to the Lanham Act,41 which applies to false advertising claims.42 
While each state may have its own version of statutes designed to prohibit 
false advertising, this article will focus on the federal statute. 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(a)(1)(B) provides that anyone who: 
in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the 
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or 
her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he 
or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.43 
Arguably, any patient or member of the public who thinks they might be 
damaged by misleading industry publications that fail to fully disclose 
information about a particular drug or treatment may decide to bring a claim 
against the company publishing such article. 
To establish a claim under this provision of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff 
must prove five elements: 
                                                   
36 Smith, supra note 9, at 293 (“Three-quarters of the articles concluding that passive 
smoking was not harmful were written by tobacco industry affiliates.”).  
37 Bero, supra note 33, at 202. 
38 Id. at 203. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 204. 
41 The reason that the industry publications may not be subject to the Lanham Act is if the 
publications in journals are not considered “commercial advertising or promotion.” Lanham 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
42 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
43 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). 
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(1) A false statement of fact by the defendant in a commercial 
advertisement about its own or another’s product; (2) the 
statement actually deceived or has the tendency to deceive a 
substantial segment of its audience; (3) the deception is material, 
in that it is likely to influence the purchasing decision; (4) the 
defendant caused its false statement to enter interstate 
commerce; and (5) the plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured 
as a result of the false statement, either by direct diversion of 
sales from itself to defendant or by a loss of goodwill associated 
with its products.44 
Applying the facts from our working hypothetical concerning the cholesterol 
study, a plaintiff may establish the elements in the following way: (1) A false 
statement in a publication by the pharmaceutical company that the new drug 
is better than standard treatment by only showing the first six months of data; 
(2) the statement has a tendency to deceive a physician in prescribing the drug 
to a patient or to deceive a patient by leading the patient to request the new 
drug to treat high cholesterol; (3) the false statement is likely to influence the 
decision to prescribe the new drug; (4) the defendant placed its study in 
interstate commerce by publishing its data; and (5) the plaintiff is likely to be 
injured because the plaintiff may have wasted time or money on a treatment 
that does not provide better results over the long term compared to the 
standard treatment and may even have different or worse side-effects.45 Thus, 
a plaintiff may be able to bring a cause of action for false advertising.  
A central problem with a claim under the Lanham Act is that a 
publication in a medical or scientific journal may not meet the definition of 
“commercial advertising or promotion”—a required element under the 
Lanham Act.46 “Advertisement” is defined as “a public notice; especially: one 
published in the press or broadcast over the air.”47 Even though the 
pharmaceutical company may have an economic interest in promoting a drug 
through scientific publications, this may be different than the direct-to-
consumer advertising that is usually governed under the Lanham Act. In 
addition, even if the Lanham Act may be available, the Lanham Act is not 
specific to concerns related to health and safety.  
In specific circumstances, other federal statutes may be available that are 
specific to public health and safety. For example, the Food and Drug 
Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007 reauthorized the 
Pediatric Research Equity Act and the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act 
                                                   
44 United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir. 1998). 
45 This is a simplified explanation of establishing a claim. These types of claims are 
broken down further into commercial claims that are literally false and claims that may be 
literally true, but convey a false impression. Id. Depending on the type of misleading industry 
publication, claims may fall under one category or the other. See William H. Manning & 
Jennifer L. McKenna, Lanham Act Also Applies to False Advertising Claims, Nat’l L.J., May 
13, 2002, at C23, available at 
http://www.rkmc.com/Lanham_Act_Also_Applies_to_False_Advertising_Claims.htm. 
Implicitly misleading claims are probably harder to prove. 
46 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). 
47 Advertisement Definition, Merriam-Webster (italics omitted), http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/advertisement (last visited Apr. 10, 2011); see also Global Telesystems, 
Inc. v. KPNQwest, N.V., 151 F. Supp. 2d 478, 483 (S.D.N.Y 2001) (citing a dictionary 
definition to define advertisement).  
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in part to regulate the use of approved medications in pediatric populations.48 
In previous work, I described the serious medical consequences of 
pharmaceutical companies failing to disclose information regarding adverse 
effects in pediatric populations or failing to conduct clinical studies of drugs 
used in pediatric populations.49 In addition, the FDAAA now requires that 
clinical trials regarding life-threatening diseases be registered in a national 
registry.50 The 2007 additions and safeguards in the FDAAA are limited in 
that they only address the public disclosure of certain categories of clinical 
trials. Some misleading industry publications, however, may not be in these 
categories. 
An obvious defense from the industry to any claim described above will be 
that industry publications are protected by the First Amendment, similar to 
the protections granted to scientific publications in general.51 Yet, although it 
is true that the law does protect scientific publications under the First 
Amendment due to the recognition that some scientific theories will be 
proposed and ultimately prove incorrect, it is also recognized and accepted 
that this type of collaboration and dissemination is required for scientific 
advancement. Importantly, much of the scientific literature is peer-reviewed, 
thus the scientific community self-patrols for reasonable theories.  
The difference between the First Amendment protection of scientific 
publications in general and the industry publications at issue in this article is 
that the industry publications are intentionally misleading in order for the 
company to make money. As discussed in Part IV below, these publications 
may not be afforded full First Amendment protection; rather, they may be 
subject to the same speech regulations as commercial speech. 
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO PROTECT SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY 
At present, no regulations exist that fully combat the problem of the 
dissemination of misleading or biased industry publications. The government 
has a substantial interest in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens. In 
addition, scientific integrity is called into question if the failure to report 
negative results from clinical trials is used to move science in the wrong 
direction. The public will begin to mistrust scientists, but it will not fully 
understand what is at the root of the problem—that is, the economic interests 
of pharmaceutical companies, whose economic interests may supersede health 
and safety.52 Described below are policy regulations aimed at addressing 
misleading or biased publications. 
                                                   
48 FDAAA §§ 401-02, 501-02, 121 Stat. 823, 866, 876 (reauthorization of the Pediatric 
Research Equity Act and the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act).  
49 Sax, supra note 26, at 71-75. 
50 Expanded Clinical Trial Registry Data Bank, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 801(a)(2)(C), 121 
Stat. 907 (2007). 
51 See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 395 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (Scientific 
and academic speech are “at the core of the First Amendment and, therefore, should receive 
the highest constitutional protection as pure speech.”). 
52 See, e.g., Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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A. Trial Registration 
Trial registry, which has been called for by others, appears to be an 
effective mechanism to ensure that information is publicly available. 53 Every 
clinical trial would be maintained on a clinical trial registry. Any publication 
that includes a clinical trial would have to cite to its registered identification 
number. This resolves the problems that stem from our working hypothetical. 
With a trial registry, even if a company decides to publish only the first six 
months of the study, the company would have to include a reference to its trial 
registry number.54 Once the scientist views the registry, the scientist will be 
able to see that the company conducted a one-year trial, but only published 
results from the first six months. Armed with knowledge that the company 
was trying to hide, the scientist can then critically evaluate the impact of the 
results. That is, the scientist will be skeptical of the results because the 
scientist now knows that the company is not reporting the full trial. The same 
applies to clinicians and policymakers. In essence, it would inhibit and 
prohibit companies from only making positive results available. The study 
design would always be available. 
Congress attempted to promote the registry of clinical trials. In 2005 and 
again in 2007, Senator Chris Dodd introduced the Fair Access to Clinical Trial 
(FACT) Act.55 The FACT Act proposed and expanded a user-friendly database 
for clinical trials.56 Nevertheless, the FACT Act was unclear as to whether it 
required that all clinical trials be registered or instead was limited to the 
mandatory registration of trials that were aimed at treating life-threatening 
conditions.57  
In any event, the FACT Act did not become law.58 It is unclear whether 
the FACT Act would have resolved many of the issues of underreporting or 
reporting bias in pharmaceutical clinical trials, which is a major problem as 
evidenced by the scandal regarding the use of anti-depressant medications in 
children.59 For example, during congressional committee hearings regarding 
                                                   
53 See, e.g., Kay Dickerson & Drummond Rennie, Registering Clinical Trials, 290 JAMA 
516, 518 (2003); Ida Sim & Don E. Detmer, Beyond Trial Registration: A Global Trial Bank 
for Clinical Trial Reporting, 2 PLoS Med. 1090, 1090-92 (2005). Of note, required trial 
registry is not mandated for non-serious or non-life-threatening diseases. See Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act of 1997 § 113, 42 U.S.C. 282(i) (2006). 
54 Select peer reviewed medical journals require that a clinical trial be registered in order 
to publish in that journal. See Erin D. Williams, Cong. Research Serv., RL 32832, 
Clinical Trials Reporting and Publication  4 (2005). This does not, however, address the 
problem of industry publications in non-peer-reviewed publications.  
55 Id. at 5 (discussing S. 470, the Fair Access to Clinic Trials Act of 2005). The 2007 
version was called the Fair Access to Clinical Trials Act of 2007, S. 467, 110th Cong. (2007) 
[hereinafter FACT Act 2007]. 
56 Williams, supra note 54, at 5; FACT Act 2007, §§ 2(1)-(4).  
57 Williams, supra note 54, at 5; FACT Act 2007, § 3(a)(4) (“The registry shall include 
information for all clinical trials conducted to test the safety or effectiveness (including 
comparative effectiveness) of any drug, biological product, or device (including those drugs, 
biological products or devices approved or cleared by the Secretary) intended to treat serious or 
life-threatening diseases and conditions . . . .”) (emphasis added). But see FACT Act 2007 § 
3(a)(4) (“The database shall include information for all clinical trials conducted to test the 
safety or effectiveness (including comparative effectiveness) of any drug, biologic product, or 
device . . . .”)  
58 See S. 467: FACT Act, Govtrack.us, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-467 (last visited Apr. 14, 2011). 
59 See Sax, supra note 26, at 76-78. 
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antidepressant clinical studies in pediatric populations, members of Congress 
learned that the FDA knew of studies that demonstrated that certain 
antidepressant drugs were ineffective in pediatric populations; however, only 
a small number of these studies were published.60 A comprehensive plan that 
includes the registration of all clinical trials and publication requirements is 
needed to resolve multiple issues with the reporting by the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
Even if Congress passes a requirement for a national registry, registry 
alone will not resolve all gamesmanship. Rather, the FDA can step in to 
expand programs that it already has to regulate misleading publications.  
B. New Proposal: An Expanded Truth in Marketing Act 
1. Existing Regulation 
The FDA has begun to crack down on false and misleading direct-to-
consumer advertising. The FDA is, in part, using the FDAAA, which amended 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) to include provisions 
regulating direct-to-consumer advertisements.61 The FDAAA grants the FDA 
the authority to preview any television advertisements for a drug prior to 
dissemination of the commercial to the public.62 If a party disseminates or 
causes to be disseminated a direct-to-consumer advertisement that is false or 
misleading, the FDAAA permits the FDA to impose a civil penalty.63 These 
FDAAA provisions are limited to addressing direct-to-consumer advertising. 
It is not clear that this could or would include scientific publications in the 
scientific or medical literature because scientific publications may not fall 
under direct-to-consumer advertising. In any event, that the FDA has 
authority to regulate false or misleading direct-to-consumer advertising 
demonstrates that the FDA could, with appropriate legislation, also regulate 
false or misleading scientific publications by some members of industry.64 
In addition to the statutory language of the FDAAA, the FDA has a 
program, the Bad Ad Program, which facilitates the reporting of violations in: 
(1) sales representatives’ presentations; (2) speaker program presentations; 
(3) TV and radio advertisements; and (4) all written or printed prescription 
drug promotional materials.65 Types of violations include: (1) omitting or 
downplaying risk; (2) overstating the effectiveness; (3) promoting off-label, or 
                                                   
60 Id. at 74-75 (citing and discussing the hearings on antidepressant pediatric trials). 
61 FDAAA §§ 901-03, 121 Stat. 823, 939-43. 
62 Id. § 902(a), 121 Stat. 939 (“The secretary may require the submission of any television 
advertisement for a drug (including any script, story board, rough, or a completed video 
production of the television advertisement) to the Secretary for review under this section not 
later than 45 days before dissemination of the television advertisement.”)  
63 Id. § 902(g), 121 Stat. 940. 
64 As described in Part III below, the FDA should be able to regulate the content of the 
industry publications so long as the publications are deemed commercial speech and any 
regulation does not violate the test articulated in Central Hudson. See Cent. Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).  
65 FDA, Truthful Prescription Drug Advertising and Promotion (Bad Ad Program) , 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/DrugM
arketingAdvertisingandCommunications/ucm209384.htm (last updated Mar. 31, 2011).  
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unapproved, uses; and (4) misleading drug comparisons.66 The Bad Ad 
Program is a step in the right direction, although it is limited in that it relies 
on the reporting by others of potential violations. Also, it is limited because it 
focuses on presentations, advertisements and promotional materials. It does 
not explicitly include scientific publications, which are not necessarily clearly 
promotional. Furthermore, it is an outreach program administered by the 
FDA. As described in the Bad Ad Program, the FDA may be able to bring an 
enforcement action against a potential violator, but it is not a regulation that 
contains a private cause of action.67 That is, the Bad Ad Program may not be 
strong enough medicine to crack down on the wide variety of misleading 
tactics employed by the pharmaceutical companies. 
The FDAAA prohibitions and the Bad Ad Program demonstrate that the 
FDA is concerned about the promotion and dissemination of misleading 
information by pharmaceutical companies. But, direct-to-consumer 
advertising is not the only way that pharmaceutical companies exert influence. 
Publications in scientific and medical journals, which this article refers to as 
indirect-to-consumer advertisements, can impact scientific progress and 
policies and have direct consequences for the public. In addition, the FDAAA 
regulations do not address a private cause of action, which may be a way to 
further clamp down on misleading publications. 
2. A Proposed Expansion 
This article proposes the introduction of a regulation to address the 
problem of misleading industry publications—the Truth in Marketing (TIM) 
Act. This new regulation should promote transparency and address the 
following areas:  
(1) if the pharmaceutical company decides to end a clinical trial 
early, then any publication of the early parts of the clinical trial 
must include a notice that the clinical trial ended early; 
(2) if the pharmaceutical company obtains any data from any 
portion of a clinical trial suggesting that the drug may cause 
harm at any time or if the data indicate that follow-up studies are 
necessary, this information must be included in any publication;  
(3) if the pharmaceutical company obtains any data from any 
portion of a clinical trial suggesting that the drug is safe and 
effective, but does not offer therapeutic advantages over standard 
treatment, this information must be included in any publication;  
(4) if a pharmaceutical company obtains any data that is contrary 
to or inconsistent with the reported conclusion(s) in a publication 
that a reasonable person in the scientific community would draw, 
that data must be included in any publication; and 
                                                   
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
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(5) a private cause of action can be brought for the violation of 
the provisions of this regulation if the FDA fails to diligently 
prosecute the violation in question.68 
Violators of TIM should face steep monetary penalties. If the monetary 
penalties do not deter—that is, the same pharmaceutical company is a repeat 
offender—the FDA should be competent to issue an injunction that prohibits 
the pharmaceutical company from conducting any clinical trials or submitting 
applications for new drugs or devices for a specified period of time.  
To determine the penalties for violation of TIM, the FDA should utilize 
economics to maximize deterrence. In brief, if one applies a traditional 
rational actor model, the formula that the pharmaceutical company will use 
when contemplating publishing biased or misleading information is whether 
the value of noncompliance is greater or less than the economic savings 
associated with noncompliance, minus the likelihood the violation will be 
detected, times the expected fine if the noncompliance is detected.69 If the 
pharmaceutical company is a rational actor, then it will comply with the 
regulation when the expected value of noncompliance is negative. If the 
expected value of noncompliance is positive, then the rational pharmaceutical 
company will ignore the regulation and violate the law because the incentives 
create a regime where it is cheaper for them to ignore the law.70 To 
successfully deter misleading industry publications, the FDA will need to 
research and assign values to the variables in order to establish the 
appropriate monetary penalties.  
The proposal of a new FDA regulation that companies must comply with 
will face opposition. Often, FDA regulations suffer from many of the same 
complaints as those that surround Environmental Protection Agency 
restrictions; that is, the rules are complex and difficult to understand, making 
compliance difficult.71 It is likely that any attempt by the FDA to restrict the 
publication of misleading information will face similar challenges. This does 
not mean, however, that the ability of pharmaceutical companies to publish 
partial truths that have the adverse consequence of misleading the medical 
community, politicians, and the public should be unchecked.  
IV. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE APPLIED TO MISLEADING 
INDUSTRY PUBLICATIONS 
The above proposals, trial registry and the TIM Act, arguably place 
constraints on industry’s speech. Industry publications, as described above, 
may be subject to the commercial speech doctrine. Although described in 
detail in the legal scholarship, a brief synopsis of the commercial speech 
                                                   
68 Cf. David Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of the 
Rational Actor Model in Environmental Law, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 917, 940 (2001) (“Most 
environmental statutes bar citizens from proceeding if the government is diligently 
prosecuting the violations in question.”). 
69 Id. at 920 (demonstrating this formula for prospective violators of environmental laws). 
The underlying rationale of environmental law can be applied to the FDA because the 
Environmental Protection Agency and FDA are both large regulatory regimes.  
70 Id. at 921. 
71 Id. at 931. 
218 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE  VOL. 37 NOS. 2&3 2011 
doctrine as applicable to the issues raised in this article is appropriate here. 72 
After this brief summary, this article discusses how the commercial speech 
doctrine may be applied to misleading industry publications. Finally, this part 
discusses how any regulations must satisfy the commercial speech doctrine 
framework in order to withstand judicial scrutiny. 
A. Commercial Speech Doctrine: A Brief Overview 
In the landmark case Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, the Supreme Court articulated that commercial 
speech is protected by the First Amendment, but that the speech remains 
subject to permissible regulations.73 The Court provided that “[u]ntruthful 
speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.”74 
In Virginia State Board, the Court acknowledged that a state may regulate 
commercial speech that is provably false, deceptive, or misleading.75 
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of 
New York, the Court again acknowledged that commercial speech may be 
afforded a lesser protection than other forms of “constitutionally guaranteed 
expression.”76 In recognition of this, the Court stated that “[t]he government 
may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to 
inform it.”77 However, any restriction of expression must be carefully 
designed.78  
Because it determines the rigor of review, a characterization must be 
made as to whether the speech in question is commercial or non-commercial. 
Regulations aimed at non-commercial, fully-protected speech receive strict 
scrutiny, whereas laws addressing commercial speech may regulate it based 
on content.79 In short, the characterization of the speech determines whether 
the speech is fully protected under the First Amendment, or whether the 
government has more leeway in regulating the speech. To make a 
determination as to whether the speech is commercial, a court looks to: (1) 
whether the speech is an advertisement; (2) whether the speech refers to a 
specific product; and (3) whether the speaker has an economic motivation.80  
                                                   
72 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial 
Speech Quandary in Nike, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1161 (2003-04); Glenn C. Smith, Avoiding 
Awkward Alchemy–In the Off-Label Drug Context and Beyond: Fully Protected Independent 
Research Should Not Transmogrify into Mere Commercial Speech Just Because Product 
Manufacturers Distribute It, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 963, 988-1016 (1999). 
73 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 
(1976). 
74 Id. at 771. 
75 See id. 
76 Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 
(1980).  
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 567. 
79 See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 395 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (describing 
that speech protected by the First Amendment receives the highest constitutional protection). 
80 Id. at 396; see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 & n.14 (1983) 
(describing that the “combination of all these characteristics” provides strong support to 
characterize speech as commercial, but that the characteristics of all three do not have to be 
present in order for the speech to be commercial). 
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Once speech is deemed to be commercial, the Court articulated a four-
part analysis to determine when the government may restrict it.81 First, the 
speech “must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.”82 Second, the 
Court must ask whether the asserted government interest in regulating the 
speech is substantial.83 Third, it must be determined that the regulation 
advances the asserted government interest.84 Finally, the Court will determine 
whether the government regulation is more extensive than necessary to serve 
the state interest.85 
Of note, if the commercial speech concerns unlawful activity or is 
misleading, the speech is not protected.86 To determine whether speech is 
misleading, it must be more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.87 If 
the commercial speech is misleading, the analysis ends there. If, however, the 
commercial speech concerns lawful activity and is not clearly misleading, then 
a court will continue to steps two through four of the Central Hudson test.88 
B. The Commercial Speech Doctrine Applied to Misleading or Biased 
Industry Publications 
An application of the facts from our working hypothetical to the 
commercial speech jurisprudence demonstrates that some industry 
publications may be subject to the commercial speech doctrine. Here, the 
industry publication hypothetical that advances the use of its drug over the 
standard treatment appears to satisfy the requirements of commercial speech.  
First, an industry publication is a promotion of a new drug. It is unclear 
whether an industry publication is an advertisement in a classical sense. As 
mentioned above, advertisement is defined as “a public notice; especially: one 
published in the press or broadcast over the air.”89 In the general sense, one 
usually thinks of advertisements as TV commercials, billboards, or ads in a 
magazine. This article refers to these types of advertising as direct-to-
consumer advertising. Industry publications in the medical or scientific 
literature that promote products to scientists and physicians do not appear to 
fall under the classical definition of advertisement because they are not ads in 
a magazine or quick clips on the television. However, the publication 
nonetheless communicates information to the scientific and medical 
community and public for the advancement of the use of a particular therapy 
and so it has some of the characteristics of the term advertisement. Put 
differently, the promotion of the drugs to doctors, who ultimately prescribe 
                                                   
81 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396-97 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
87 Id. at 397 (quoting Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 74-75 (D.D.C. 
1998)). 
88 Id. This summary of the commercial speech doctrine is cursory. Legal scholarship in 
this area analyzes the clarity or lack thereof in utilizing the commercial speech doctrine. 
Indeed, even decisions in lower courts demonstrate uncertainty when applying the commercial 
speech doctrine. See generally Smith, supra note 72, at 988-1016. 
89 Advertisement, supra note 47; see also Global Telesystems, Inc. v. KPNQwest, N.V., 151 
F. Supp. 2d 478, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing a dictionary definition to define advertisement).  
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the medication to patients, is what makes this speech a promotion of a 
particular product.90 This article utilizes the term, indirect-to-consumer 
advertising, to describe the promotion of an industry’s product in the 
scientific or medical literature to the medical community for use in the 
general public or to entice academic scientists to use federal funding dollars to 
conduct research. Second, the publication refers to the specific drug 
manufactured by the company, and, finally, the company has an economic 
motivation to promote the use of its drug.91  
A potential counterargument to the above analysis that deems industry 
publications commercial speech is that “academic and scientific” speech are 
afforded full First Amendment protection, and that industry publications fall 
within “academic and scientific” speech.92 This is a weak counterargument, 
however, if the industry publication is placed in a non-peer reviewed journal, 
the publication deliberately omits important scientific information and the 
purpose of the publication is to reach the medical community in order to 
promote the sale of the product.93 The reason that scientific and academic 
speech is fully protected is to let ideas flow freely within a community to allow 
science to progress and allow for paradigm shifts. Industry publications, 
which are not peer reviewed or intentionally leave out important information 
that would change the conclusions, do not promote the free flow of ideas or 
allow for paradigm shifts. Here, the industry publication is specifically 
describing the advantages of its particular product in an effort to increase 
sales and revenues related to its product. Applying facts from our working 
hypothetical, it is clear that the purposes of the publications are to promote 
the use and sales specifically of the company’s new product, which is why it 
may be characterized as commercial speech.94 This may mislead the scientific 
community, the public at large, and policymakers. 
If the publications in our working hypothetical are deemed commercial 
speech, an analysis must next determine whether the government may restrict 
the speech.95 The first prong of the Central Hudson test is to determine 
whether the speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.96 
Misleading is defined as “likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting 
                                                   
90 See IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 45, 54 (2008) (finding valid a restriction of 
the ability of pharmaceutical representatives to utilize physicians’ prescribing history for use in 
detailing). 
91 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561-
63 (1980). 
92 See, e.g., Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 395 (addressing arguments as to whether 
“promotional activities amounted to scientific and academic speech, which resides at the core 
of the First Amendment”). 
93 See id. (“[A]lthough the prescription drug industry presented a different context than 
traditional forms of consumer advertising, it was clear that the speech to doctors was intended 
to drive sales of products because ‘to the extent that physicians are the gatekeepers to sales, the 
marketing efforts must be directed at them.’”  (citation omitted)). 
94 If the speech was not deemed commercial, the question then arises as to whether the 
TIM Act regulates protected speech and could survive strict scrutiny. I thank my colleague, 
Larry Benner, for raising this important issue. An argument can be made that the government 
has a compelling interest to regulate the conduct of the speech at issue in this article and that 
the TIM Act is narrowly tailored to this interest. 
95 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
96 Id. 
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reasonably under the circumstances.”97 Here, an industry publication that 
intentionally omits data that demonstrates that the new drug does not offer 
better therapeutic treatment after one year when compared to the standard 
treatment is misleading to the reader.98 For example, a prescribing physician 
who reads that the new drug offers greater therapeutic advantage than the 
standard treatment may recommend that their patients use the new drug over 
standard treatment. This will increase the sales for the pharmaceutical 
company, but the new treatment does not offer the patient advantages over 
the long-term. It is reasonable to assume that a physician would want to use 
what he considers to be the best drug in the treatment of the patients, and an 
industry publication that omits the long-term data may influence the 
physician to prescribe the new drug.  
Furthermore, if an additional fact is added to our working hypothetical, 
such as that the pharmaceutical company provides pens and pads of paper to 
physicians with the company logo, this might create an additional influence 
on the prescribing physician to prescribe the new drug. Studies have shown 
that even small gifts can have the impact of unduly influencing the decisions 
that physicians make in prescribing medications.99 The point is that over the 
years, the pharmaceutical industry has utilized tactics that promote their 
products and increase the sale of their drugs. Many of these tactics impact the 
way physicians prescribe drugs, even on an unconscious level.  
In sum, by publishing only the results from the first six months of the 
trial, which demonstrates that the new drug is superior to the standard 
treatment, the company is misleading scientists, clinicians, and the public to 
believe that the new drug offers greater therapeutic advantages to treat a long-
term cholesterol problem than the standard treatment. This publication is 
misleading. Once there is a determination that the speech is misleading, the 
analysis ends there. 
One problem with characterizing the speech in our working hypothetical 
as misleading is that a court may require an affirmative statement in order for 
the speech to be considered misleading. The misleading nature of the speech 
in the working hypothetical is misleading because there is an omission of data. 
In other words, the inclusion of the long-term data would lead a reasonable 
scientific person to conclude that the new drug does not offer any therapeutic 
advantage over standard therapy, while by the omission of that data, the 
reasonable scientific person is misled to believe that the industry’s 
conclusion(s) are taken from the six-month data, which indicate that the new 
treatment may offer better results than the standard therapy. For this reason, 
an analysis of the other three elements of the Central Hudson test is critical. 
                                                   
97 Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 126 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Oswego 
Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank,  647 N.E.2d 741, 745 (N.Y. 1995)). 
98 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.  
99 Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., Industry Funding of Medical Education: Report of 
an AAMC Task Force 4 (2008), www.aamc.org/publications (search publications: Industry 
Funding) (“Supplementing the robust psychosocial evidence regarding the effect of gifts on 
physician decision making, recent neurobiological studies document that inherent biological 
processes can cause individuals to respond reciprocally—and typically unconsciously—to 
relationships involving even simple gifts, sponsorships, or the development of personal 
relationships.”). 
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The second prong of the Central Hudson test analyzes whether the 
government has a substantial interest in regulating the speech. 100 Here, the 
FDA has a substantial interest in regulating the use of prescription drugs in 
order to protect the public.101 All clinical trial protocols to study an 
unapproved drug or an approved product for a new indication must be 
approved by the FDA, via the Investigational New Drug Application. 102 In 
order to obtain FDA drug approval, the results of clinical trials must be 
reported to the FDA.103 The FDA’s scheme that regulates clinical trials with 
the purpose of having public health and safety at the forefront may be 
thwarted by publications that fail to fully report clinical trials. That is, even 
though the pharmaceutical company must report results from clinical trials to 
the FDA so that the FDA can assess the results and make decisions that 
consider the public’s health and safety, by reporting only a portion of the 
results from the clinical trials to the medical community directly, this can chip 
away at the FDA’s purpose of protecting the public. The government has a 
substantial interest in requiring full disclosure of clinical trial data to the 
scientific and medical communities and the public such that unbiased and 
non-misleading information reaches the public to ensure public health and 
safety.   
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) also has a substantial interest in 
the funding of scientific research.104 If a scientist submits a grant application 
that includes proposals for research that rely on industry publications that 
conceal data, the scientist may be on a wild-goose chase, with the government 
funding the effort. This has the negative effects of wasting valuable scientific 
resources as well as costs to the taxpayers who fund academic research. In 
sum, the government has a substantial interest in protecting the health and 
welfare of its citizens. 
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101 Centers & Offices, FDA (last updated Feb. 15, 2011), 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/default.htm (“The FDA is responsible for 
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103 New Drug Application, Introduction, FDA (last updated Aug. 20, 2010) 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApprov
ed/ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplicationNDA/default.htm (“The documentation 
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104 NIH & Clinical Research: About Us, Nat’l Insts. of Health, 
http://clinicalresearch.nih.gov/about.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2011) (“The National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), a part of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, is 
the primary Federal agency for conducting and supporting medical research.”).  
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The third element in the Central Hudson test is that the regulation 
advances the asserted government interest.105 Here, it is not clear that any 
federal regulation that is in effect at this time requires a publication to include 
all of the results of all clinical trials. The Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 1997 only requires the public registration of clinical 
trials that address life-threatening conditions.106 Again, for drug approval the 
FDA requires that a company apply to conduct a clinical trial and report the 
results to the FDA; but nothing in the regulations require that the company 
publicly report the results.107 This lack of regulation, in part, may allow a 
loophole for industry to underreport negative results of clinical trials in 
publications. As described in Part III, the TIM Act would close the current 
loophole. In sum, the TIM Act directly advances the government interest of 
protecting the health and safety of the public because it would require the 
disclosure in scientific and medical literature of data that may lead a 
reasonable scientific reviewer to conclude differently from the stated 
conclusions in the publication.  
Finally, a determination is made as to whether the government regulation 
is more extensive than necessary to serve the state interest. 108 Again, at this 
time, no regulation addresses the requirement of dissemination of negative 
results of all clinical trials. But if the policy objectives of the TIM Act are 
turned into a regulation, this regulation must comply with the requirements 
of the Central Hudson test. 
In sum, no current regulation adequately regulates misleading or biased 
industry publications in scientific and medical literature. The government has 
a substantial interest in protecting the public health and should enact 
regulations to address misleading or biased publications. Mandatory trial 
registry and the TIM Act are strong starting points to address misleading and 
biased industry publications, but any new policy must be wary of a claim that 
the regulation violates First Amendment rights. This symposium is an 
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(2006); see Guidance for Industry, Information Program on Clinical Trials for Serious or Life-
Threatening Diseases and Condition (Mar. 2002), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM126838.pdf (“Section 
113 of the Modernization Act creates a public resource for information on studies of drugs, 
including biological drug products, to treat serious or life-threatening diseases and conditions 
conducted under FDA’s investigational new drug (IND) regulations (21 CFR part 312).”).  
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purposes, impossible.  
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important place to continue the dialogue of the increasing role of the 
commercial speech doctrine in health regulation.   
V. CONCLUSION 
Misleading or biased publications reporting results of clinical trials 
cannot go unchecked due to the potential for harmful effects on scientific 
integrity and public health. The commercial speech doctrine allows the 
government to regulate some speech if there is a defined purpose. Thus, the 
growing role of the commercial speech doctrine in health regulation—the 
important topic of this symposium—is the launching point for the government 
to regulate misleading or biased indirect-to-consumer publications. 
The current policies of the FDA are a good starting point, but these 
regulations do not necessarily reach misleading industry publications that are 
not clearly advertising. This article proposes the expansion of current FDA 
policies to cast a wider net to include indirect-to-consumer marketing. 
Policymakers can learn from publicized stories over the past few decades—
such as the tobacco industry tactics and breast implant cases—to draft 
regulations to ensure that the scientific and medical communities, 
policymakers, and the public have accurate information in order to make the 
best healthcare decisions. In this way, scientific integrity—which benefits the 
public—can be protected and continue to provide improved healthcare 
services to the public. 
